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In the Supreme Court
of the State of Utah
GORDON L. WEIGHT,
Plaintiff and Respondent,

I

Case No.

- vs.HARRY B. MlLLgR, and HARRY B.
~tiLLER, dba LORRAINE PRESS,
Defendant and Appellant.

10037

'

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT
NATt:RE OF T·HE CASE

This is an action by Plaintiff Gordon L. Weight to
rpeover on a promissory note in the amount of $1,200.00
and exeeuted in his favor by Defendant Harry B. Miller
on the 2nd day of January, 1960.
Dl~POSITION

IN ·THE LOWER COURT
The District Court of Salt Lake County, State of
Utah, with Judge :Merrill C. Faux presiding, awarded
judgment to Plaintiff in the amount of $1,200.00, $92.00
interest, attorney's fees in the amount of $348.33 and
$15.00 costs.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Defendant Harry B. }filler seeks reversal of the
decision of the lower court. Plaintiff Gordon L. Weight
~t.'~:'ks affirmance of the lower court's decision.
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STATEMENT OF FACTS
Respondent shall hereinafter be referred to as Plaintiff and Appellant shall hereinafter be referred to as
Defendant.
Plaintiff ~pts Defendant's Statement of Facts
except in certain particulars noted as follows. Plaintiff
does not concede that Plaintiff initiated the conversation
with respect to entering into an employment agreement.
Plaintiff denies that Defendant was specifically relying
upon the payment by Plaintif~ of the balance of $3,800.00
in order to purchase ~ certain printing press. Plaintiff
does not agree that Defendant often reminded him that
the balance of $3,800.00 was due but states affirmatively
that the Plaintiff did not specify any particular time
within which t~e balance should be paid. (R-11) Plaintiff asserts that he did not state to the bookkeeper Ruth
!larks on the 18th of January, 1960, that he was employed
elsewhere at the time. (R-40) Plaintiff further asserts
that he did not break appointments with customers
and did not evidence a loss of interest in his work.
Plaintiff further denies that Defendant ever offered
to pay him stock of the corporation as payment of the
promissory note. (R-21)
On the 1st day of October, 1959, Plaintiff and
Defendant entered into an Employn1ent Agreement. The
tern1s are essentially as set forth in D·efendant's Statement of Facts. Prt:!viously the Plaintiff had paid to the
Defendant $1,200.00 The Agreement contemplated a
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

3
promis~ory

note r{'presenting the investment made by
Plaintiff. One such note was initially prepared for
signature but was not signed by the Defendant. (R-10,
~~. 30) During December, 1959, the Defendant became
dissastisfied with Plaintiff's performance, ( R-28), reminded him of such, discussed the matter with Mr.
~tontgomery, Plaintiff's attorney at the time (R-98),
und as a result of such dissatisfaction stated to Plaintiff
that he would discontinue paying hitn a salary and
in~t~'ad pay him a 10% commission of sales. R-28)
;\:-; a result of such condition imposed Plaintiff became
dissatisfied with the working relationship and the employment arrangement was mutually terminated.
As a cumulation of such termination the Defendant
t>xecuted a promissory note on January 2, 1960, representing the initial. amount invested by Plaintiff. (R-3,
~~l. 73, and P-1). Since the money was invested in Sept~:>mlwr, 1959, the note was dated as of September, 1959,
in order to entitle Plaintiff to interest from that date.
1

H-73).

ARGUMENT
POINTS URGED FOR AFFIRMING DECISION OF
LOWER COURT
POINT I.
THE LOWER COURT DID NOT ERR IN HOLDING
THAT THE EMPLOYMENT AGREEMENT WAS
MUTUALLY TERMINATED AND THAT THE
PROMISSORY NOTE IN THE AMOUNT OF $1,200.00
WAS EXECUTED SUBSEQUENT TO SUCH TERMI-
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NATION AND THEREFORE HAD NO RELATIONSHIP WITH THE EMPLOYMENT AGREEMENT.

In considering the soundness of the trial courts'
findings and jndgtnent this court Inay indulge in the
presuntption that the judgrnent was valid and was based
upon competent evidence. The evidence and all inferences that fairly and reasonably may be drawn therefrom
1nust he viewed in light most favorable to it. The burden
here is upon the Defendant in affirmatively showing that
the trial court was in error. The following authorities
are cited in support of the foregoing propositions:
Charlton v. Hackett, 11 U 2d 389, 360 P2d 176 (1961);
Cheney v. Rucker, 14 U2d 205, 381 P2d 86 (1963).
The trier of fact can best judge the credibility of the
witness and the weight to be given the evidence for he
can observe firsthand their demeanor, forthrightness
and candor. Jones v. California Packing Corp., 121 U
612, 244 P2d 640; Page v. Federal Security Insurance
Co., 8 U2d 226, 332 P2d 666 ( 1958).
The evidence substantiates the court's findings that
the parties had tern1inated the employment relationship
and that the note in question was executed after such
termination and, therefore, had no relationship with the
employment agreement. In support of such contention
Plaintiff sub1nits the following points:
( 1) The Defendant was dissatisfied with the performance of the Plaintiff and especially so in December,
1959. (R-72, 76). He felt so keen about the matter that
the Defendant left Plaintiff notes or memos reminding
him about the fact that he was not earning as much as
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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h(' was being paid. (R-27).
(~)

The Defendant contacted 1tir. Montgomery,
Plnintifrs attorney at the time, and discussed the matter
with him. On that occasion the Defendant stated that
ht• was "afraid he was going to have to let him go." It
is significant that the Defendant felt so keenly about the
mattPr that he felt prompted to discuss the matter with
Mr. Montgomery. (R-98).
(3) Between January 2, 1960, and January 18, 1960,
the Defendant had no contact with the Plaintiff and did
not call him in order to inquire as to the reason for the
Plaintiff not working. Such action on Defendant's part
was certainly consistant with the position that the
Defendant considered the employment relationship
terminated (R-85, 86).
(4) In December, 1959, the Defendant imposed as a
condition of future employment that the Plaintiff should
be paid on a 10% commission basis instead of a regular
salary. Such condition was at variance with the terms
of the Employment Agreement. The commission basis.
was to be retroactive to December 15th. The Defendant
refused to pay the Plaintiff for the last two weeks in
December. (R-27, 28).
(5) The Plaintiff too was dissatisfied with the employment relationship. Defendant had not allowed him
to participate in management and it was not his understanding that he should remain pennanently as a salesman. (R-27, 28).
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(6) On January 2, 1960, the Defendant at Plaintiff's
request, executed the promissory note on a blank printed
fonn secured frmn an office supply company. (R-39,
73, P-1. The note was initially dated January 2, 1960,
but this date was crossed out and the date September
1, 1959, was inserted. This was for the sole reason of
entitling the Plaintiff to interest from the date of his
initial investment. (~73). It is significant that the note
rri.ade no mention of the Employinent Agreement or that
the proceeds should be paid in stock. (P-1). The note
was made after the termination of the Employment
Agreement and is unequivocal with respect to the mode
of payment.

(7) The Plaintiff and Defendant conversed about
the repayment of note at a time subsequent to its execution. This conversation took place outside of the
State Purchasing Office of the State Capitol. On that
occasion the Defendant evidenced some concern about the
Plaintiff trying to "peddle the note" and thereupon
indicated that he would pay off the note. (R-21, 22).
No mention was 1nade, however, about paying the note
off in stock.
(8) While it is true, as Defendant asserts, that the
initial investment was made in contemplation of subsequently receiving stock in the Lorraine Press after it
it was incorporated, it was also true that these matters
never did materialize during the course of Plaintiff's
employment. It is also true that a note was prepared
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for Defendant's signature. (R-10, 29, 39). This note
was never signed The note that eventually was executed
was executPd after the agreement was terminated and
was not tlw note contemplated in the agreement. It was
not for the same amount and made no reference to the
<'{)ntract or agreement and made no reference to the
fact that the payment should be made in stock.
From the foregoing evidence the court could have
justifiably held that the employment agreement was
terminated in a number of ways. Written contracts may
be rescinded by oral agreements. 12 Am. Jur., Contracts
§ 432; Restatement, Contracts. Vol 2 § 407. They may
also be rescinded or terminated by implication as a
result of the acts of the parties. An example of such
is where the contracting parties subsequently make a
new contract inconsistent with the term sof the former
agreement, as Plaintiff and Defendant did in the present
case. 1:2 Am. J ur., Contracts, §433; Restatement, Contracts, Vol. 2, §508; Copper King Mining Co. v. Hanson, 52 Utah, 605, 176 P. 623. On January 2, 1960,
~ome three months after the execution of the employment
agreement, the Defendant executed the note in question.
And as has been repeatedly stated this note made no
mention of the employment agreement or that the preCPeds should be paid in stock. Therefore, such note was
inconsistPnt with the terms of the former agreement.
The lower court could also have based its decision
on the fact that the contract was rescinded or termin-
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ated ·qecause of a n1aterial breach by the Defendant. It
12 Am. J ur., Contracts, § 440; Restatement, Contracts,
is well settled that a 1naterial breach warrants rescission.
Yol. 2, § 397;. }.lcBride v. Stewart, 68 Utah 12; 249 Pac.
114. Certainly the Defendant's apparent refusal to sign
the initial promissory note prepared or his refusal
to pay the Plaintiff a wage would constitute material
breaches.
POINT II.
THE .LOWER COURT DID NOT GO BEYOND THE
SGOPE OF THE PRE-TRIAL ORDER IN DETERMINING THAT THE EMPLOYMENT AGREEMENT
WAS MUTUALLY TERMINATED AND THAT THE
PROMISSORY NOTE WAS NOT QUALIFIED BY
THE TERMS OF THE AGREEMENT.

The Pre-Trial Order states as follows: "The only
question for the trial court to determine will be whether
or not the note in question is any part of the contract
attached to the answer." The inquiry and testimony
during the trial related to whether or not the note in
question was a part of the en1ployment agreement. Much
of the testimony dealt with whether the Plaintiff aml
Defendant terminated their employ1nent relationship.
This testimony was certainly material to the basic
question involved, for if the employment relationship
was terminated as the court found then the promissory
note which was subsequently executed was not part of the
contract as Defendant contends.
The lower court did not alter the ter1ns of the
employment agreement by requiring that re-payment
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of Plaintiff's investment be made in "money" instead of

··sto('k" as Defendant alleges. The court held, and
justifiably so, that the employtnent contract was terminated at the time the note was executed. Therefore, it
had no relationship with the agreement. As such the
note existed as a separate obligation according to the
tt•rms thPrPin which provided for the payment in ·money.
The Defendant's point that the trial court went
beyond the scope of the pre-trial order is not well taken.
All of the evidentiary tnatters considered were necessary
and incidental to the basic question established by the
pre-trial order. Even assuming that the court exceeded
the scope of the. pre-trial order. Defendant's position
is without merit. The doctrine of "Waiver" and "Invited Error" have application here. It is significant
that with the exception a few basic inquiries submitted
to Plaintiff by his counsel on direct examination, (R-2, 3)
all of the testimony elicited was from defendant's witnesses. The Defendant even made the Plaintiff his
witness. The testimony upon which the trial court based
its decision was elicited from Defendant's witnesses. It
is noteworthy that with one exception the Defendant
did not object to the admission of the testimony of the
various witnesses nor did he object that the scope of
Plaintiff's cross examination exceeded the scope of
Defendant's direct examination. That one exception
was with respect to the admission of the original unsigned note into evidence.

ter!Ult

tr~
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It is well settled that a party may not complain to the
appeal court about the improper admission of evidence
which he himself has introduced of elicited. 5 Am. Jur.,
Appeal and Error, § 562, 717. Lowman v. Kuecker, 246
Iowa 1227, 71 NW2d 586, 52 ALR 2d 1380.
CONCLUSION
Plaintiff respectfully contends that the trial court
did not err in holding that the pron1issory note in question was a separate and distinct obligation from the
employment agreernent. Even though the note related
to the initial $1,200.00 investment by Plaintiff it was
executed after Plaintiff and Defendant mutually terminated their relationship. The note made no mention
of the ernployment agreement or that it was to be paid
in stock. The court did not go beyond the scope of the
pre-trial order; the evidence from which the court based
its findings was supplied by Defendant's witnesses and
\'.'::t,J subrnited without objection frorn Defendant that
the testimony was beyond the scope of the pre-trial order.
The pre-trial order limited the issues to an inquiry as
to whether or not the note in question was related to
thP e1nployment agreement. Implicit within such inquiry
was the determination whether or not the employment
agreement was operative at the time the note was executed. The court held that it was not, and rightly so.
Respectfully submitted,

LAYNE B. FORBES
Attorney for Plaintiff & Respondent
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